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contact is to prevent multiplicity of suits upon remote and possibly
groundless claims." Finally, a state has an interest in promoting its inhabitants' business relations. By subjecting nonresident buyers to suit in
Texas for such minor contacts as making payments in the forum, the state
would be discouraging the sale of its products."
The U-Anchor decision places a logical limit upon the exercise of longarm jurisdiction. In light of the public policy considerations involved, UAnchor will promote interstate business with Texas corporations, and will
help insure that Texas residents are protected by their state's long-arm
statute and secure in their judgments under it. In respect to fundamental
fairness, which is the basis of the minimal contacts test, U-Anchor will
eliminate the absurd possibility of mail-order customers or other small
purchase consumers being dragged into litigation in a distant forum upon
insignificant claims. The case points out that "minimum contact" is more
than merely a contact, and that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" require some "relevant""6 contact with the benefits and
obligations of the forum's laws to invoke long-arm jurisdiction.
Richard E. Sames

COMMUNITY PROPERTY-Garnishment- Ex-wife May
Bring Garnishment Proceedings to Secure Her Share
of Ex-husband's Military Retirement Pay Under
the Federal Consent Statute

United States v. Stelter,
553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ granted).
Plaintiff, Dorothy M. Stelter, brought a garnishment proceeding against
defendant. Jurisdiction in the Texas court was based on the fact that the note sued upon was
payable in Texas.
64. In Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1956)
the court stated,
It requires no flight of fancy to foresee the resulting maze of lawsuits adjudicating the
interests of persons having only the faintest and most remote links with the state
exercising authority. If the due process clause is not effective to restrain such extensions of local power, then the federal system is likely to be transformed. ...
65. McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Scholsberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 907 (D. Minn. 1971);
Conn v. Whitmore, 342 P.2d 871, 875 (Utah 1959) (what appears advantageous to the state's
businesses would be detrimental in the long run).
66. In Zeisler v. Zeisler, 553 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd),
a case decided after U-Anchor, the court stated that an obligation to perform in the forum
would be sufficient contact when coupled with any other relevant contact.
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the United States in order to secure a portion of her ex-husband's military
retirement pay previously awarded her in a property division during divorce proceedings. Based upon the federal consent statute,' the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Stelter. The United States
appealed, contending that military retirement pay is current wages for
personal services and that the term "alimony" as used in the federal statute does not include the division of military retirement pay by a Texas
divorce judgment. Held-Affirmed. An ex-wife may bring garnishment
proceedings to secure her share of her ex-husband's military retirement
pay under the federal consent statute.2
Upon a decree of divorce, Texas relies on the partition of the community
property to protect the divorcing parties' rights3 and does not provide for
permanent alimony.4 Texas law defines permanent alimony as a court
ordered allowance of periodic payments for support imposing a personal
obligation upon the husband after a final decree of divorce.' Although
Texas has no provision for permanent alimony, temporary alimony may be
awarded prior to the final decree of divorce.'
In the divorce decree the community property is divided equitably,7 and,
if necessary, income from one spouse's separate property may be awarded
to the other spouse. The community property consists of all property
1. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. V 1975). This provision allows the United States government
to be sued for the enforcement of child support and alimony obligations of government
employees. Id. For the purposes of this case note, § 659 is referred to as the federal consent
statute.
2. United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
granted).
3. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 496, 40 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1931) (court might
provide for wife by division of estate of parties); Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 444 (1855) (division
of community property should be made with due regard to rights of parties); Pape v. Pape,
35 S.W. 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ dism'd) (division of community property amply
provides for wife); see Osborne v. Osborne, 207 S.E.2d 875, 880 (Va. 1974) (Texas community
property division protects same right as does alimony in Virginia).
4. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967); McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d
930, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ); McBride v. McBride, 256 S.W.2d 250, 253
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1953, no writ).
5. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32-33 (Tex. 1967); see Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 496, 40 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1931).
6. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1969) (defining temporary alimony); see,
e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 140 S.W.2d 519, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940, no writ)
(temporary alimony is conditional); Pape v. Pape, 35 S.W. 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896,
writ dism'd) (alimony may be pendente lite or permanent and generally does not include child
support); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon 1974) (allowing temporary alimony).
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
8. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (lstDist.] 1974,
no writ) (division may be unequal); McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1963, no writ) (award of payments referable to any property either spouse may
have owned is valid); cf. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977) (income
from separate property may be set aside for support of minor children).
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acquired during marriage except that which is acquired by gift, devise or
descent' and may include unmatured retirement benefits."
After such a division, the failure of the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife
her portion of the retirement benefits often has led to contempt of court
proceedings." These proceedings, however, have frequently been ineffective because they provide only for imprisonment of the recalcitrant exhusband and give the ex-wife no right to recover money directly from the
retirement fund. 2
This predicament may have been alleviated somewhat by the passage
in 1975 of a federal consent statute 3 allowing the United States to be sued
in garnishment proceedings brought to enforce the child support and alimony obligations of its employees. Prior to this act the federal government
had enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit, 4 and an ex-wife could collect
her portion of retirement pay only from the ex-husband.'3' The consent
statute gave the ex-wife an opportunity to secure alimony" and arguably
her share of retirement pay directly from the federal government.' 7
9. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1976), noted in 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 135

(1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975); see McKnight, Texas Family Code and
Commentary, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 281, 346 (1974).
10. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976).
11. See Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976,
no writ); Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ
dism'd).
12. Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no
writ) (failure to pay ex-wife her share of retirement pay directly); see Ex parte Yates, 387
S.W.2d 377, 379-380 (Tex. 1965) (failure to make payments to ex-wife to redeem promissory
note awarded her by divorce court); Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd) (failure to pay ex-wife's court awarded share of retainer
payments into registry of court).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . moneys (the entitlement to which is
based upon remuneration for employment) due from . . . the United States . . . to
an individual, including members of the armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States were a private person, to legal
process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obligations
to provide child support or make alimony payments.
Id. In Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976) the
court concluded that the Texas courts must determine whether the consent statute applies
to community property.decrees. Id. at 166.
14. McGrew v. McGrew, 38 F.2d 541, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1930); S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 53-54, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8133, 8157.
15. See Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976,
no writ); Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ
dism'd).
16. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 8133, 8157.
17. Wilhelm v. United States Dep't. of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 166 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
(state courts must determine whether consent statute applies to community property decrees).
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Despite the opportunity afforded by the federal consent statute, its enforcement faces two obstacles in Texas. Texas garnishment law exempts
from garnishment current wages for personal services.' 8 The term "current
wages for personal services," as generally used in exemption statutes,
means compensation to be paid periodically." The exemption statutes in
Texas have traditionally been given a liberal interpretation in favor of the
party seeking protection.'" A liberal interpretation of the term "current
wages for personal services" could include retirement benefits and some
courts have held that such benefits are a part of the worker's compensation
not subject to garnishment.' On the other hand, where the retirement pay
is community property which has been divided by a divorce court, direct
payment to the ex-wife of her portion of the retirement pay may be ordered
by the court against the retirement fund.2"
The second obstacle in Texas to the application of the federal consent
statute is the Texas public policy strongly prohibiting alimony." This policy, if strictly applied to the consent statute, appears to prevent recovery
under its provision of garnishment for alimony. 4 Nevertheless, there are
18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966), provides in part that "no current
wages for personal service shall be subject to garnishment ...."
19. Alemite Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 50 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1932, no writ); J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1931, no writ).
20. See, e.g., Moore v. Neyland, 180 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1944,
no writ) (protecting "business homestead"); Illich v. Household Furniture Co., 103 S.W.2d
873, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1937, writ ref'd) (protecting wife from husband's postnuptial debts); Brasher v. Carnation Co., 92 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ
dism'd) (protecting laborers); J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1931, no writ) (protecting laborers).
21. Prewitt v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ)
(teacher retirement funds part of member's compensation and not subject to garnishment);
see In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1976) (pension benefits
represent form of deferred compensation for services rendered); Cearley v. Cearley, 544
S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1976) (retirement plans regarded as compensation earned); Byrd v.
City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 28, 36, 6 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1928) (fireman's retirement funds part of
agreed compensation); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968, writ dism'd) (retirement plans mode of employee compensation).
22. See Collida y. Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
dism'd) (allowing ex-wife to receive her court awarded share of retirement benefits directly
from Fireman's Retirement Fund). But see United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 318, 321 (5th
Cir. 1968) (denying assignment of serviceman's pay before it becomes due and payable).
23. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 548 (1942) (interpreting Texas alimony statute); Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967) (defining permanent alimony);
McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ) (permanent
alimony is against public policy); McBride v. McBride, 256 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1953, no writ) (award of permanent alimony is against public policy of this
state); Pape v. Pape, 35 S.W. 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ dism'd) (statutes make no
provision for permanent alimony); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon 1975) (providing for
temporary alimony).
24. See Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230, 1231 (5th Cir. 1977).
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two views as to how the term "alimony" in federal statutes should be
interpreted with regard to a division of retirement pay by a Texas divorce
court." The more restrictive view considers military retirement pay earned
during marriage to be a community property right available for division
by the divorce court" and does not consider it to be alimony." The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals supported this view by stating that Texas law
rejects the contention that military retirement benefits should be treated
as alimony payments."8 It may be argued that application of the federal
consent statute to a Texas division of community retirement pay is precluded by this view since Texas does not consider a property division to
be alimony" and since the statute, while providing for alimony, makes no
express provision for community property divisions.3
The liberal view gives the term "alimony" as used in federal statutes
wider applicability. A Florida Court, for example, decided that for the
purposes of United States statutes, a Texas division of military retirement
pay amounted to alimony and allowed garnishment of a portion of the
retirement benefits." In construing another statute, the Fifth Circuit
treated pension benefits awarded by a Texas divorce court as alimony."
Other courts have extended the liberal interpretation of the term
"alimony" to encompass attorney's fees. 3 Under the liberal view, a division of retirement pay by a Texas divorce court would be alimony under
25. Compare Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230, 1231 (5th Cir. 1977) and Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd) with In re
Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1975) and Williams v. Williams, 338 So. 2d 869,
870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
26. See Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970); Ex parte Sutherland, 515
S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd); Mora v. Mora, 429
S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd).
27. Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
see Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ
dism'd); Andrews v. Andrews, 441 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (concerning future payments, but not retirement benefits).
28. Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230, 1231 (5th Cir. 1977).
29. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970); Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d
137, 140-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd); Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83,
85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. V 1975).
31. Williams v. Williams, 338 So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); cf. Osborne v.
Osborne, 207 S.E.2d 875, 880 (Va. 1974) (Texas' scheme of economic adjustment upon dissolution of marriage protects same right as does alimony in Virginia). See generally Comment,
Substitutes for Alimony-A Review of Methods for Providing Periodic Support Payments
Subsequent to Divorce, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 314, 324 (1968) (proposing permanent alimony);
Comment, Permanent Alimony-Disguised in Property Settlement Agreements, 11 S. TEx.
L.J. 269, 278 (1969) (proposing permanent alimony).
32. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1975). In construing the Bankruptcy
Act, the court included a division of military retirement pay in Texas under the term alimony.
33. In re Birdseye, 548 F.2d 321, 323 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363, 1365
(7th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the consent statute.
In United States v. Stelter" a serviceman's ex-wife sought to secure her
portion of her former husband's military retirement pay by bringing garnishment proceedings against the United States under the federal consent
statute. The court attempted to determine whether these proceedings violated the Texas exemption law prohibiting garnishment of "current wages
for personal services."3 It reasoned that the original divorce decree transformed the ex-wife's portion of the retirement pay into her separate property and her portion thus did not constitute current wages of the exhusband." Garnishment of her portion of the retirement pay therefore did
not violate Texas exemption laws prohibiting garnishment of "current
wages for personal services."37 The court also adopted the liberal interpretation of the term "alimony" as used in the federal consent statute by
allowing a division of retirement pay by a Texas divorce court to be encompassed within that term. 8 The liberal interpretation adopted by the Stelter
court strengthened the Texas trend toward improving the wife's position
in divorce settlements,3 ' and provided her with a means of suing the federal
government to secure her share of the retirement pay.
Notwithstanding the equitable result achieved by giving the ex-wife a
means to secure her share of retirement pay, this liberal interpretation
seems to differ from prior Texas construction of the term alimony. 6 Before
Stelter the Texas courts had not considered the federal consent statute but
had decided that an order to deliver the wife's share of community retirement pay does not constitute an award of alimony." The Stelter court's
34. 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ granted).
35. Id. at 229.
36. Id. at 229; see Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1974, writ dism'd) (wife's share of Naval Reserve pay divided by divorce court belongs to her,
not to her ex-husband).
37. United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
granted).
38. Id. at 229.
39. See generally Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1976) (community
property extended to include unaccrued pension); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.
1970) (community property extended to include accrued military retirement pay); Collida v.
Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ dism'd) (ordering retirement fund to send wife her share of community retirement benefits directly). But see Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977) (holding wife not entitled to husband's
separate property).
40. See Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974,
writ dism'd); Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
41. Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(division of military retirement benefits upon divorce is division of vested property interest
and not award of alimony); see Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd) (order to deliver wife's share of retirement payments is
not order to pay alimony); Andrews v. Andrews, 441 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss3/12

6

Strackbein: Ex-wife May Bring Garnishment Proceedings to Secure Her Share of

1978]

CASE NOTES

interpretation of the term alimony to include a division of community
retirement pay seems to conflict with the earlier view.42
In May of 1977, legislation was enacted further defining the term
"alimony" as used in the consent statute by specifically excluding any
payment or transfer of property in a community property settlement., 3
This clarification statute, although allowing Texas residents to sue for
temporary alimony, excludes the application of the consent statute to the
recovery of a community property division of retirement pay, as was done
in Stelter.44 The statute, placing community property settlements beyond
the scope of the federal consent statute, deprives a spouse in Texas of the
remedy of securing a court awarded portion of retirement pay directly from
the United States government. Texas residents are evidently discriminated against by the clarification statute because Texas is the only community property state without permanent alimony and is therefore the
only state where the clarification statute denies access to the permanent
alimony provision of the consent statute.' 5 The clarification statute adopts
the conservative view of the term "alimony;" it does not, however, alter
the effect of Stelter over the period prior to the statute's passage because
the Stelter trial court's decision preceded the statute's effective date .4
While Stelter construed the federal consent statute, it did not consider
the question of federal preemption. The preemption question arises because the classification given military retirement benefits by Texas seems
Worth 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (future payments made after divorce as part of community
property settlement does not amount to alimony).
42. See United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977,
writ granted).
43. 42 U.S.C.S. § 462 (Supp. June, 1977). "The term 'alimony' ... does not include any
payment or transfer of property or its value by an individual to his spouse or former spouse
in compliance with any community property settlement ....
Id.
44. 42 U.S.C.S. § 462 (Supp. June, 1977). "The term 'alimony' ...

includes .

.

. ali-

mony pendente lite ..
" Id.
45. Comment, Permanent Alimony-Disguised in Property Settlement Agreements, 11
S. TEx. L.J. 269, 272 (1969); see ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (1956); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4811
(Deering 1972); IDAHO CODE § 32-706 (1963); LA. CIv. CODE ANl. art. 160 (West Supp. 1977);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV.

§ 26.09.090 (Supp. 1976). Texas alone among community property states has no
permanent alimony, and this places Texas residents at a disadvantage with respect to residents of other community property states because the clarification statute amends the federal
consent statute by excluding community property settlements from its terms.
46. 42 U.S.C.S. § 462 (Supp. June 1977). Since the effective date was not given in the
statute, it became effective on May 23, 1977, the day it was signed by the President. 2 D.

CODE ANN.

SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 33.06, at 9 (4th ed. 1973)..

But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
380-81 (1969) (subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to
great weight in statutory construction).
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to conflict with the classification given such benefits by some federal
cases.4" Texas treats retirement benefits as earned property rights which
become community property during marriage.48 Some federal cases, however, have treated retirement pensions as gratuities." The clarification
statute evidently excludes community property settlements, including divisions of retirement benefits, from the confines of the consent statute.10
Since military retirement pay is considered a gratuity under federal case
law,5' it appears inconsistent to include it under the 1977 clarification
statute as community property. Construction of the clarification statute in
accordance with federal cases treating military retirement pay as a gratuity rather than as a property right could lead a federal court to the conclusion that the clarification statute does not exclude military retirement pay
from the scope of the consent statute. 2 A further difficulty arises, however,
if retirement pay is classified as a gratuity by federal preemption. As a
gratuity it apparently would not be available for apportionment because
Texas law seems to allow only community property, which does not include
a gratuity to a spouse, to be divided upon divorce.53 Federal preemption
47. See generally Comment, The Unsettled Question of the Military Pension: Separate
or Community Property?, 8 CAL. W.L. REv. 522, 533-34 (1972); 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 135, 142
(1977).
48. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976) (includes unaccrued pension
benefits as community property); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970) (includes
disability retirement benefits accrued during marriage as community property); Ex parte
Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd) (includes
payments to be received after divorce as community property).
49. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S.
160, 166 (1895); Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248, 249 (Ct. Cl. 1948); 9 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 135, 142 (1977).
50. 42 U.S.C.S. § 462 (Supp. June, 1977). "The term 'alimony'... does not include...
any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of
property between spouses. . . " Id.
51. See cases and material cited note 49 supra.
52. See generally Comment, The Unsettled Question of the Military Pension: Separate
or Community Property?, 8 CAL. W.L. REv. 522, 533-34 (1972); 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 135, 142
(1977).
53. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977) (the only "estate of the
parties" to be divided is the community property); McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190,
193, 345 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1961) (wife must look to community property for share of property
on divorce); Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1960) (prohibition
against divestiture of title applies to separate property but not to community property). But
see In re Marriage of Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ
dism'd) (allowing community estate rights of reimbursement from husband's separate estate); Dorfman v. Dorfman, 457 S.W.2d 417, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, no writ)
(judge not restricted to consideration of community assets only in making partition); Earnest
v. Earnest, 223 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ) (court is invested
with wide discretion in disposing of all property, separate or community); McKnight, Texas
Family Code and Commentary, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv. 281, 338 (1974). A gratuity does not
become a part of the community estate. See Hilley v. Hilley, 342 S.W.2d 565, 567, 569 (Tex.
1961).
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